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MORAL RIGHTS: PRINCIPLES, PRACTICE AND NEW
TECHNOLOGY, by Mira T. Sundara Rajan. Oxford University Press,
2011. 572 pp. Paperback $150
Reviewed by Cyrill P. Rigamonti, University of Bern, Faculty of Law.
TTcyrill.rigamonti@iwr.unibe.ch
The stated purpose of Sundara Rajan’s book on moral rights is twofold,
namely to establish what is meant by moral rights as a global phenomenon
and to examine moral rights issues in view of new technological
developments. She states right up front that she approaches the subject with
a clear goal, which is “to make a case for moral rights as an essential
weapon in the fight to preserve human creativity in the Digital Age” (p.29).
The text is well written and easy to read, perhaps because it is more a
collection of interesting vignettes rather than a pedantic scholarly narrative.
However, despite the word “practice” in the title, practitioners should not
expect the book to be a comprehensive reference, as the cases selected do
not necessarily reflect the entire body of case law on the subject.
In terms of structure, the book is divided into ten self-contained chapters,
which is advantageous for readers who want to pick and choose just one or
two chapters. The first chapter (pp.1-30) provides an introduction to the
basic notions of moral rights law and explains why moral rights are ever
more relevant in the digital age, but it does not really explain in what sense
moral rights differ from economic rights when it comes to the challenges of
the digital environment, especially as far as enforcement issues are
concerned. Similarly, the second half of the book, which is meant to
address the current and future development of moral rights in view of
technological change, dedicates almost as much space to regular copyright
law as it does to moral rights.
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The second chapter (pp.31-113) essentially outlines the law of moral rights
in France, Germany, and the United Kingdom, and gives some background
on the historical development of the doctrine. Sundara Rajan begins each
country description with brief discussions of the very early stages of the
doctrine’s development, but then rather abruptly jumps to overviews of
current moral rights law in these countries, basically leaving gaps of up to
200 years in the case of France and the United Kingdom. In addition, the
legal overviews are at times rather cursory and suffer from the fact that they
focus heavily on statutory rules, thereby disregarding to a large extent the
sometimes rich and complex case law, even though it is critically important
for a proper understanding of delicate issues such as waivers. In the section
on the United Kingdom, Sundara Rajan claims that moral rights were
recognized in the 1769 landmark case of Millar v. Taylor and then rejected
for good in 1775 in Donaldson v. Beckett. Although it is true that the nonpecuniary interests that later became the justification for moral rights were,
in retrospect, neatly outlined by Lord Mansfield in Millar, 1 he neither had a
clear theory of moral rights in the modern sense nor did the facts of these
cases involve a moral rights scenario. Both Millar and Donaldson were
about common law copyright protection in the context of what today would
be a straightforward copyright infringement case. Saying that Millar
recognized moral rights is as much an exaggeration as saying that
Donaldson rejected moral rights. Sundara Rajan seems to acknowledge this
herself in the fourth chapter, explaining that Donaldson was “essentially a
response, not to the moral rights idea, but to a different type of claim”
(p.241), but this statement should have been included in the discussion of
these cases in the second chapter in order to avoid misunderstandings.
The third chapter (pp.115-225) continues to provide overviews of different
moral rights regimes, in particular those of the United States, Australia,
Canada, India, Japan, and Russia. This is perhaps where Sundara Rajan
makes her most valuable contribution to the study of moral rights by going
beyond the often discussed jurisdictions of Western Europe and the United
States. Indeed, one of the best segments of the book is the subchapter on
India (pp.163-81), precisely because the author provides quite a bit more
background and detail than she does about other countries. The pages
describing the many transformations of Russian moral rights law are also
illuminating (pp.188-222).
In the fourth chapter (pp.227-81), Sundara Rajan reviews the status of moral
rights in the most important international copyright treaties, in particular the
Berne Convention, the TRIPS Agreement, the WIPO Copyright Treaty, and
the WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty. Occasionally, it would
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have been helpful if some of the claims had been better supported by
evidence, for example the claim that 19th century authors such as Victor
Hugo “certainly recognized the idea of moral rights and were familiar with
its significance as a legal concept in French and Continental law” (p.243),
or that the presence of moral rights in the 1928 Berne Convention “was
clearly a product of their efforts” (p.243), which is not at all that clear.2
Moreover, the statement that the WIPO Copyright Treaty “makes no
reference whatsoever to moral rights” (p.259) is difficult to understand
given the explicit reference in Article 1(4) to the Berne Convention, which
obviously includes a moral rights provision in Article 6bis. Perhaps the
most interesting topic of this chapter is the question of why moral rights for
performers were included in the WIPO Performances and Phonograms
Treaty, the answer to which is not self-evident given the traditionally hostile
attitude of the United States, its primary driver, towards moral rights
generally. Unfortunately, the book does not go beyond suggesting that an
extra layer of rights might benefit the music industry indirectly (pp.267-68).
Sundara Rajan concludes the chapter with a call for further international
harmonization in order to adapt moral rights to technological change, but
she wisely warns that an international legislative framework will not be
enough and that “the solutions will need to address long-term problems,
deeply ingrained legal biases, and deep-seated cultural prejudices” (p.280).
The fifth chapter (pp.283-319) marks the beginning of the second part of the
book, which is dedicated to moral rights in the digital context. In particular,
Sundara Rajan discusses moral rights as they apply to computer programs
as “literary works” and reviews different national approaches that tend to be
somewhat restrictive even in countries in which moral rights are generally
accepted. She concludes that “the legal imperative to treat computer
programs as literary works may be mistaken” (p.297) and recommends the
exemption of functional uses from moral rights protection by limiting moral
rights to the protection of honor and reputation. In addition, she argues in
favor of exceptions to allow for the development of new features or
programs, without, however, giving concrete details on how such an
exemption would have to be crafted. Sundara Rajan also reiterates the
importance of applying moral rights in the corporate context on the basis of
a human rights argument and with the goal of establishing “a more humane
environment in the software industry” (p.301). This line of thought is a
distinctive feature of the book, even though there is no apparent reason to
recast moral rights protection in human rights language in order to make the
case for applying moral rights in a corporate context. A purely utilitarian
rationale invoking the importance of attribution as an economic value would
probably be more effective in practice. The motion picture and videogame
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industries are good examples of how complex attribution systems can
develop even in the absence of statutory moral rights protection as an
important element of doing business, selecting talent, and building careers.
The sixth chapter (pp.321-73) addresses moral rights and digital issues in
music, again on the basis of an understanding of moral rights as “human
rights of authors and artists” (p.327). By contrast, however, the chapter’s
primary focus is on economic rights in the context of sampling, mixing, filesharing, legal downloading, and the global licensing of music through ISPs.
From the point of view of moral rights, the most interesting segments in this
chapter relate to whether splitting albums, format shifting, and the use of
music to create ringtones violate moral rights, the latter of which is explored
through the lens of a pioneering decision by the German Supreme Court.
As part of her recommendations, Sundara Rajan reiterates that moral rights
should also be protected in the digital context but cautions that they should
be “subject to certain modifications which are appropriate to this
environment” (p.371). In her view, this means that the right of attribution
should be “exercised with technological necessity in mind” and that the
right of integrity should be “restricted to situations of damage to reputation”
(p.371). The latter is, of course, exactly what the minimum standard of the
Berne Convention is all about.
Moral rights in film are the subject matter of the seventh chapter (pp.375435). The fact that motion pictures cannot be created without the
collaboration of a large number of people has always been a challenge for
copyright law. This is no different for moral rights. Accordingly, the focus
of this chapter is placed on the definition of authorship in moral rights law,
which is indeed an important topic given that the exercise of these rights
depends on establishing authorship. Sundara Rajan’s review of the laws of
various countries shows that there are vastly different approaches to
authorship across the globe. A large portion of this chapter is dedicated to
India, which is particularly useful, because it brings lesser-known, yet very
interesting cases to the attention of a broader audience. As part of her
recommendations, she concludes that the moral rights of disclosure,
attribution, and integrity are “appropriate for film”, but “should be tailored
to the practical requirements of the medium” (p.433). Sundara Rajan also
observes that moral rights have not chilled the film industry in those
countries that do have them, and that the defensive position of the United
States is “quite anomalous” in this respect (p.434), potentially generating
“national embarrassment” if “Hollywood’s neglect of moral rights translates
into American disregard for America’s own filmmakers” who receive better
protection abroad than at home (p.434). Consequently, she concludes this
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chapter with a call for the United States not to be left behind, as there is
“little need for the American film industry to be fearful” (p.435).
The eighth chapter (pp.437-85) returns to more standard turf by addressing
moral rights in the visual arts. Sundara Rajan aptly notes that, in this area,
moral rights attract ready sympathy, receive stronger protection than other
kinds of works, and are recognized even where the general recognition of
moral rights is in doubt, such as in the United States. She also observes that
“moral rights of visual artists often turn upon a special approach to the
interpretation of the moral right of integrity in the visual context” (p.439),
which is indeed the case, given that some countries tend to extend the right
of integrity into the realm of preservation of cultural heritage, thereby
extending the traditionally individualist approach to moral rights into the
social sphere. In this context, the book briefly discusses the Visual Artists
Rights Act of 1990 and the special provisions regarding the visual arts in
Canadian moral rights law, and further includes short reviews of illustrative
international cases, such as the Calatrava case in Spain. A recurring theme
in this and previous chapters is the author’s culturally sensitive critique of
copyright law and Western moral rights regimes as being based upon a
romantic notion of authorship that is exaggerated and often inadequate to
deal with the needs for attribution and integrity of Aboriginal communities.
Accordingly, in the context of the Australian Yumbulul case, Sundara Rajan
explores the idea of an “Aboriginal moral right that would be vested in the
community concerned” and that may also be a “possible solution to the
dangers of cultural appropriation” (p.454), but she also openly
acknowledges the difficulties in applying such a right in practice. A large
part of this chapter is devoted to conceptualizing moral rights as a bridge
between intellectual property rights and the protection of cultural heritage,
using Indian moral rights cases as a conduit for discussion.
The ninth chapter (pp.487-532) addresses moral rights in the context of
what Sundara Rajan calls “open access”. It includes an analysis of creative
commons licenses, which put a premium on attribution and integrity, but,
contrary to what the book claims, do not provide an “alternative to
copyright protection” (p.497). The entire idea of creative commons is to
work within the copyright system and use it to enforce its licensing terms
when necessary, even if the standard terms of creative commons licenses
happen to be more permissive than others. Sundara Rajan also criticizes the
creative commons approach of enabling free access while retaining a certain
level of authorial control by arguing that authors cannot make a living
giving away their works for free. The latter may be true in the abstract, but
the argument overlooks that the creative commons movement does not force
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anybody to make his or her work available for free. It simply provides
licensing options for those who want to disseminate their works without
being paid while providing users with legal certainty about the terms of the
applicable copyright license. In the balance, this passage creates a
surprising contrast in attitude to the first 500 pages of the book, which are
almost exclusively concerned with the non-economic interests of authors on
the basis of moral rights understood as human rights. Following a few
words about the theoretical relevance of moral rights in the context of the
free software movement and large-scale collaborative undertakings of the
Wikipedia type, Sundara Rajan turns to the Google Book project. This is an
unusual choice for a book on moral rights, given that moral rights are the
least of Google’s copyright problems, with the exception perhaps of the
question of whether displaying “snippets” of texts violates the author’s
moral right of integrity. Unfortunately, however, this issue is not explored
in depth. Analytically, the claim that the moral right of disclosure is
implicated if a book is included in Google’s archives (p.524) is also strange,
because this right is typically understood to be limited to the first disclosure,
and such disclosure must have happened long before Google incorporated
the book in its digital archive.
In the tenth chapter (pp.533-35), Sundara Rajan concludes the book with
two messages that are keyed to her two stated purposes of defining moral
rights and exploring their application in the digital environment. First, she
finds that moral rights are a “robust doctrine” that is “widely accepted in
countries representing diverse traditions” and that consists of increasingly
different approaches also throughout common law countries (p.533).
Second, she maintains that moral rights are ever more needed in the digital
environment, because they “protect knowledge” and “turn social attention to
the human side of culture” (p.535).
The book is definitely an interesting read. Those who are not familiar with
moral rights or copyright law may want to read it as a whole, as a collection
of stimulating issues, not just regarding moral rights, but also regarding
economic rights. Scholars in the field who are already well-read on the
doctrine of moral rights and its history can still benefit by focusing on
Sundara Rajan’s overview of moral rights regimes that are not as well
known in the Western hemisphere, in particular the previously underexplored countries of Russia and India.
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See also Cyrill P. Rigamonti, Deconstructing Moral Rights, 47 Harv.
Int’l L.J. 353, 381-82 (2006).
For a different account on why moral rights were inserted into the Berne
Convention during the 1928 revision conference, see Cyrill P.
Rigamonti, The Conceptual Transformation of Moral Rights, 55 Am. J.
Comp. L. 67, 111-119 (2007).

© 2012 Cyrill P. Rigamonti
Suggested citation: 3 The IP Law Book Review 1 (2012)
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Vol. 3 No. 1 (November 2012) pp. 8-18
CLEAN TECH INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: ECO-MARKS,
GREEN PATENTS, AND GREEN INNOVATION, by Eric L. Lane.
Oxford University Press, 2011. 276 pp. Paperback $185
Reviewed by Joshua D. Sarnoff, De Paul University College of Law.
jsarnoff@depaul.edu
Eric Lane seeks to explain the title of his book, CLEAN TECH
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: ECO-MARKS, GREEN PATENTS,
AND GREEN INNOVATION, by justifying the categories of clean tech
and clean tech intellectual property (IP). But experts sum it up, they define
clean tech by its goals and intentions, i.e., what it does instead of what it is:
[C]lean tech is marked by its diversity but unified by its purpose. That
purpose, of course, is to benefit the environment and mitigate climate
change by “generating energy through renewable sources, boosting energy
efficiency, and reducing greenhouse gas emissions” (p.1).
Given this broad set of goals for clean tech, and the broader set of
technologies and practices that can promote or hinder those goals, Lane
addresses a similarly broad set of IP topics, which he collectively labels
“eco-marks”, “green patents”, and “green IP” (p.1). Green IP is
“characterized by clean tech’s unique features, which tend to make certain
issues more prevalent in clean tech IP than in IP focused on other
industries” (p.2). The specific issues that Lane addresses are: (1) patent
prosecution, portfolios and licensing; (2) clean tech patent litigation
(including assertions by non-practicing entities, who are sometimes
pejoratively referred to―but not by Lane―as patent “trolls”); (3) green
branding, greenwashing, and enforcement of eco-marks; and (4) policies,
initiatives, and debates over how best to promote development (and
patenting) of clean tech (pp.ix-xii). Of course, these are only a few of the
topics that Lane could have addressed, which include but are not limited to:
(5) different approaches to promoting innovation, from reliance on private
enterprise and markets (and competition regulation) to government
procurement to university-based development to commons-based
approaches; (6) IP and international trade law concerns; (7) copyrights and
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digital rights (including interoperability concerns, anti-circumvention
measures, and limits on reverse engineering); (8) data protection and access;
and (9) information privacy (particularly with regard to smart grid and other
innovative technologies). 1
Fortunately, and notwithstanding the typical promotional over-reaching (the
front inside cover calls the book the “first comprehensive review of
intellectual property and clean technology”), all clean tech IP is not Lane’s
focus. Rather, and much more manageably, Lane focuses on the issues of
greatest importance to his self-proclaimed specialty (and thus to his
clientele, and to others who are similarly situated), i.e., “helping technology
companies build, grow, and manage their patent and trademark portfolios,
with a particular focus on renewable energy and other areas of clean
technology” (“About the Author”). Lane thus bases his book on personal
experience and additional information gained from interviews with
technology developers (“Acknowledgements”). Consequently, the book’s
scope is manageable, its focus is practical, its knowledge-base is real, and it
is well-documented with concrete examples. Although the book is partially
adapted from law review articles typically read by academics
(“Acknowledgements”), the book’s audience appears to be principally
business people who need an exposure to these legal issues and thus may
become more interested in pursuing green tech IP, the general public, and
non-IP lawyers who may not have encountered the area. IP lawyers and IP
academics may still be interested in reading about the topics with which
they are not already familiar with or assigning the book to students. As an
introduction to the issues, it does a terrific job. As an explanation of how to
actually make the required business and legal decisions it may be seriously
lacking.
As Lane himself notes “[o]ne of the themes this book explores is the
importance of green patents to small clean tech innovators, entrepreneurs,
and startups” (p.4). Lane’s theme makes eminent sense, the book fulfills
the promise of this theme more than adequately. Recent survey evidence
has demonstrated that entrepreneurs―particularly venture-financed startups
―may rely more on patents than do other inventors, businesses, and related
institutions:
While venture-backed startup executives rate the incentive value [of
patents] more highly than do those at [Dunn & Bradstreet-sampled]
companies, in no category are patents reported to provide even a
“moderate” incentive for any of the four entrepreneurial activities
about which we queried. 2
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Given what may be irrational assumptions and requirements of venture
capitalists, there will continue to be a need (and probably an increasing
need) for the patenting, licensing, and litigation strategies that Lane
discusses.
Given the existing and anticipated expansion of clean
technologies and services and of the businesses that will supply them, the
same is true for the importance of developing and regulating eco-marks,
certification marks, and other branding strategies.
Before getting to the meat of those discussions, it bears noting that although
Lane’s initial focus on terminology may seem somewhat defensive for a
book published in 2011, when clean tech and intellectual property measures
relating to them are actually well established, his purpose in doing so is
highly salutary. Many (particularly the business and general public
audience that his book appears directed at) may not understand what these
categories cover. Further, because Lane’s basic premise is that clean tech
IP is different from other IP areas, definition is critical. Lane apparently
believes clean tech IP is different because of three central features: (1) the
diversity of technologies; (2) its reliance on R&D developed from prior
green technology research and computers and semiconductors; and,
particularly, (3) its “moral underpinning as a vehicle for the greater good”
(pp.2-3). Given this premise, Lane argues that “green IP issues pose unique
challenges and raise profound legal and moral questions about the nature of
innovation, the best way to facilitate transfer and deployment of clean
technologies, and how to protect green consumers” (p.3).
At one level, I doubt the validity of Lane’s premise regarding the difference
of clean tech IP from other IP as it is stated. Although clean tech IP does
address a wide variety of technologies and relies on prior R&D, many
complex and complementary fields of technology in history have been
charged with social development and other moral premises, particularly
development of medicines and other treatments for neglected diseases.
However, I ultimately agree with Lane that the magnitude of the current
technology needs and nature of the climate concerns add a unique layer of
moral imperative to the category of “clean tech” that may not have existed
with the development of many earlier technologies, such as steam engines,
railroads, computers, or biotechnology. Given that moral imperative, the
book not only is timely but also is very much welcome as a practical guide
to developing and managing the technologies that are needed. This is
particularly important in light of the debatable choice made in the context of
international climate change negotiations to rely on the patent system and
private markets to develop and disseminate the needed mitigation and
adaptation technologies. 3 And if the book also helps to promote his legal
practice, Lane will have earned it.
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As Lane notes, “many of today’s green tech inventions are derivative and
incremental improvements upon prior developments in clean tech or borrow
from other industries” (p.15), which raises questions about their
patentability under traditional criteria of novelty (including inherency) and
non-obviousness, which Lane briefly reviews (pp.15-20). This assumption
of incremental innovation is important to beliefs that the patent system is
well suited to assuring access to climate change technologies. For
incremental innovations, existing non-patented technologies may be
substitutes that impose price constraints. In contrast, for breakthrough
technologies, such as a major development in carbon capture from coalfired electric utilities, worldwide pressures to override patent rights will
likely arise for measures such as outright exclusion from patentable subject
matter, compulsory licensing, or competition law-based remedies. 4 Lane
then describes numerous patent drafting strategies to match the doctrinal
concerns, providing a concrete example of silent, swift wind turbine
technology (pp.20-29). These strategies, of course, are also technology and
business development strategies, as a “creative patent attorney will work
with inventors to tease out” whatever may be patentable (p.21) and thus
whatever may be worth patenting because it presents a useful product or
process that a patent owner would seek to license.
Similarly, Lane describes the development of patent portfolios for windturbine and municipal waste, biomass, or coal gasification technologies
(pp.30-57), noting that the size and components of a successful portfolio
will depend on the innovation space and on capturing the “key innovations
that support a company’s business strategy, which often are those that
differentiate the company from its competitors” (p.57). While no doubt
accurate at this level of generality, Lane both highlights the importance of
those features and fails to supply useful guidance for how business people
or lawyers can effectively identify those features for themselves. However,
it would be unfair to expect this from a book pitched for general interest,
and even a treatise may not be sufficient to convey the practical knowledge
required to make such judgments. But it emphasizes that the book is (and
perhaps only could be) a basic introduction to the subject.
To conclude this section of his book, Lane discusses the important topic of
technology transfer and licensing. He focuses on intellectual property
licensing as both an out-licensing strategy that can overcome barriers to
entry in product markets, create business efficiencies, and allow rapid
scaling up of production and market access (or facilitate joint marketing
arrangements), or that may avoid production entirely by becoming a nonpracticing entity licensor in all or only in secondary markets (pp.59-67, 70-
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80). Lane also discusses an in-licensing strategy (pp.68-70) that can avoid
the need “to develop products from scratch” (p.58).
As Lane notes, because of the high costs of patent litigation, clean tech
court disputes involve multiple technologies (from wind power to efficient
light emitting diodes, LEDs, to Toyota Prius hybrids) that have been scaled,
are widely commercialized, and are profitable (pp.83-85). He provides
detailed descriptions of three such disputes (involving wind, LEDs, and
biofuels), and notes some of the differences between litigating in federal
district court and in the International Trade Commission, the strategic use of
reexamination, and the frequent goal of litigating to promote licensing
rather than to protect market share (which is sometimes done even though it
may not make economic sense given the high costs of litigation) (pp.86115). Lane then turns to litigation by non-practicing entities (NPEs), this
time noting limits on injunctive relief (and consequent resort again to the
ITC) and provision of ongoing royalties (which effectively impose a
compulsory patent license at the royalty amounts set by the judge), and
notes the development of patent licensing companies that bring suit as
NPEs, by inventors of important patents to new technology sectors―such
as the smart grid (pp.116-146).
In concluding this section, Lane extrapolates from these discussions to
predict future patent litigation in the clean-tech area. Unsurprisingly, he
focuses on wind power, LEDs, and hybrid electric (and plug-in and fully
electric) vehicles. He also notes, based on market penetration, that solar
thermal (solar cell and solar photovoltaic (PV)) technologies are likely to be
litigated, as may additional biofuels technologies (e.g., cellulosic ethanol
from sources that do not compete with food supplies) (pp.147-150).
Although Lane’s predictions are no doubt likely to be correct, they are also
obvious. They are also limited to the areas that he focuses on; many other
climate-related or otherwise green technologies will achieve scalable results
and market sizes and profits that will make patent litigation attractive to
existing and entering market participants and NPEs. Thus, other than very
well written and documented anecdotes about patent litigation in the sectors
described, which may help to educate an audience that does not already
know much about patent litigation, it is not clear what value these
discussions bring.
Lane opens this section of the book by proclaiming that, “[i]ndeed, we stand
at the dawn of the Eco-mark Era―a period in which green branding,
advertising environmentally friendly products and services, and touting
sustainable business practices will be pervasive and profitable” (p.151). I
wholeheartedly agree with this conclusion, but again (at least to me) it
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seems obvious. Lane then suggests what may be the value of this
section―a discussion not of whether firms will (with increasing frequency)
highlight their eco-friendly practices but “how they will do so” (p.151).
Accordingly, the first chapter of this section discusses protection of ecomarks, the legal problem of descriptiveness as a barrier to registration, and
strategies for overcoming that problem. Lane follows with a discussion of
“greenwashing,” which he defines as “making false or misleading claims
regarding purportedly environmentally friendly products, services, or
practices,” and then concludes the section with a discussion of protection
and enforcement of eco-marks, focusing on litigation and its effects on
consumers (p.152).
Notably missing from his summary—although not from his actual
discussion, which notes in the discussion of green mark registration the
example of certification by the US Green Building Council, (p.156) and
discusses certification marks explicitly as a good strategy: “[i]f a firm’s
core business is affected by green characteristics” (p.162)―is the use of
certification marks that identify not the source or origin of goods or services
but their purported compliance with certification standards that may help
the public to identify eco-friendly goods and services (pp.153-67). Unlike
for the earlier patent sections, Lane uses his examples in this section to offer
some concrete advice regarding branding strategies to avoid descriptiveness
rejections (i.e., adding non-descriptive or arbitrary elements to the mark,
disclaiming green terminology and separate use, as required by the
registering authority, combining incongruous but related elements, avoiding
eco-references in descriptions of goods and services, and (if all else fails)
relying on acquired distinctiveness (secondary meaning) or registering on
the Supplemental Register until acquired distinctiveness can be shown
(pp.156-62).
When discussing greenwashing, Lane delicately notes the market incentives
for brand owners to be “tempted to make lazy, unsubstantiated green claims
[or even] worse, [for] some businesses [to] try to deceive green-leaning
consumers or engage in other forms of eco-mark abuse. . .” (p.168). Since
greenwashing, false environmental claims, and inadequate (or inadequate
policing of compliance with) certification standards apparently are an
endemic and growing problem, Lane himself notes this “disturbing trend,”
citing to a study conducted by a marketing organization, 5 which found all
but one of over 1000 self-declared green products to have “displayed some
form of greenwash by committing at least one of the [seven] sins” of
greenwashing:
(1) hidden harmful trade-offs associated with the
environmental benefits claimed; (2) lack of proof or substantiation; (3)
vague or otherwise unintelligible claims; (4) false labeling (to provide the
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impression of a third-party environmental endorsement); (5)
environmentally irrelevant claims; (6) the lesser of two evils (when the
claim is comparatively true but the overall impact of the product is
harmful); and (7) outright fibbing (pp.168-171). In response to perceived
widespread greenwashing, public and private responses have emerged
(pp.171-73), including the Federal Trade Commission’s guidelines for
environmental marketing claims, 6 and various websites that rate the claims
and overall environmental records of particular companies. 7 Of perhaps
greater interest, Lane notes actions taken by a public certifying entity (the
Department of Energy for the “EnergyStar” program) and by private
individuals to seek to impose liability and corrective actions on companies
falsely obtaining certifications or making false (or at least deceptive) claims
—although he also notes the uncertain ability to successfully litigate such
cases and the questionable effectiveness of settlements that so far have been
achieved, achieving “mixed results” (pp.176-185). This is perhaps the
strongest of Lane’s chapters, as its descriptions highlight the tawdry reality
and the undeveloped state of the law, although it still leaves the reader
wondering how to effectively navigate the field (e.g., describing what will
meet the FTC marketing requirements, much less how to effectively
avoid―or, for those less morally inclined, skate close to without
committing―the seven sins). The reader is left with the impression (which
I believe is correct) that law reform is badly needed to make private
litigation more effective, to encourage public action to more aggressively
police greenwashing (which Lane recommends, p.199), and to adopt laws
that will more effectively deter such conduct in the first instance.
This leads Lane to the chapter on enforcement of eco-marks themselves.
Here, even when describing standard trademark litigation, Lane fails to
provide the general reader with the basic standards (typically, an eightfactor balancing test) for establishing trademark infringement. He jumps
instead to the most salient (and typical) factors that result in preliminary
injunctions being issued (pp.187-88). Interestingly, Lane also notes one
case where the defendant ignored the preliminary injunction and defaulted
on appearing to contest the case, resulting in a permanent injunction. This
example raises the issue as to whether trademark law is also ineffective in
stopping infringing sales of mass produced products from foreign
jurisdictions. His other litigation example, as it had not concluded,
similarly fails to provide an adequate assessment of “the actual impact on
green consumers” (p.191). In contrast, Lane provides an optimistic
example of a successful injunction against a false use of a certification mark
on biodegradable bags and food containers (pp.192-93). Lane also notes
concerns about litigation that, because of failure to reject marks for
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descriptiveness, may preclude other companies from using consumerfriendly descriptive terms in their marks, as well as litigation that threatens
the use of common, environmentally friendly symbols (like the apple)
(pp.194-98).
Lane’s final set of chapters address: (1) measures to promote development
and diffusion of clean tech by sharing and pooling clean-tech patents (such
as GreenXchange and the Eco-Patent Commons), by providing access to
green-patent data (such as Europe’s Green Patent Database and the Clean
Energy Patent Growth Index), and by accelerating green patent applications
in the UK, Korea, the US, and other countries (pp.200-226); (2) differing
views within the context of the UN Framework Convention on Climate
Change (UNFCCC) expressed (largely) by developing countries and the UN
Secretariat on the one hand and developed countries on the other over
whether the patent system hinders (or helps) clean tech development and
diffusion, and (ultimately rejected) proposals to weaken patent rights in
regard to climate change technologies (pp.227-236); and (3) examples of
significant technology transfer deals (pp.237-48) that “may represent the
beginning of a major global diffusion and deployment of clean
technologies” (p.202) and which “recognize that green patents are not a
problem in addressing climate change, but part of the solution.” Again,
Lane’s descriptions are rich, balanced and accurate, and clearly presented,
and he has fairly presented differing views on the benefits or detriments of
relying on the patent system to develop and disseminate needed climate
change mitigation and adaptation technologies.
Nevertheless, I differ substantively from Lane regarding what appears to be
his optimistic view of these developments and of the potential for “clean
tech transfer [to] happen irrespective of IP rights” (p.202), at least to the
extent that I believe is necessary to adequately address climate change and
other pressing environmental concerns. For one thing, he quotes to a study 8
that concludes that patent rights “‘cannot possibly be an obstacle for the
transfer of climate change technologies’” to the poorest countries because
they lack patent rights at all (p.248). But this simply disregards the problem
that the World Trade Organization Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property Rights (the “TRIPS Agreement”) restricts compulsory
licensing for export to other countries. 9 That restriction, widely recognized
to prevent low-cost generic production of medicines for transfer to the
poorest countries, was overridden as a result of international pressures, 10
but only for medicines and not in regard to climate change technologies.
Nor does the fact that “global deployment of clean technologies is
happening on an ever-increasing scale” or the existence of major deals
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between developed countries and business partners “in emerging markets
such as Brazil, India, and China” (p.249) indicate that IP rights do not
hinder technology transfer. We lack any counterfactual world or good
natural examples to prove these claims or to test the alternatives. Even
Lane acknowledges that, given the lack of attractive markets and profits,
“neither technology sharing mechanisms based on donating or pooling
patents nor green patent databases are going to spur diffusion of clean
technologies to the poorest nations” (p.216). Nor is it clear that rich
countries will willingly pay the high prices to purchase and transfer
patented technologies without imposing price constraints through
compulsory licensing or government procurement or third-party production
authorizations (or take the other actions purportedly required by their
international commitments under the UNFCCC and other treaties) to meet
the rapidly increasing mitigation and adaptation needs. 11
However, I candidly admit that I lack the ability to disprove Lane’s
optimism. I agree with Lane’s observation that a comprehensive study to
determine if IP rights are more of an incentive or an obstacle to technology
transfer may be impossible and would require “empirical patent data, global
trade statistics, economic analysis, and scores of interviews with
representative from clean tech companies” that currently do not exist
(p.236). Further, I believe that these disputes reflect common (and highly
polarized) politico-philosophical differences that ultimately are based on
fundamental faith in or skepticism towards markets or towards government
intervention in them. 12 So although I beg to differ, I offer this alternative
perspective not as a criticism of Lane’s optimism but as a caution against
un-critical acceptance of it. And we both agree that “[u]ndoubtedly, IP
rights will continue to be debated as the UNFCCC talks continue in the
years to come” (p.236).
Eric Lane has made a very valuable, extremely readable, and thoroughly
enjoyable contribution to the field of clean technology and intellectual
property that will help readers who are not already familiar with the topics
to understand why these issues matter and to get a very good feel for patent
and trademark issues that are raised. Lane’s ability to give the reader
practical insights gained from actual experience is the book’s strength, and
his clear and accessible discussions make the book very well designed for
what appears to be his intended audience―business people, the general
public, and non-IP lawyers who may need to know something about the IP
law issues. Given that audience, it would be unfair to criticize him for not
developing the book further to provide the strategic insights that would
benefit the IP lawyers who will actually provide their clients with advice.
But I hope he will do so in some format, and thereby supply what seems
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most missing from the present book. To do so will likely require
developing a treatise rather than a 250-page paperback. But it should pay
off even more handsomely both in royalties from grateful IP lawyers and in
client development opportunities.
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Why should things be simple? Or put another way, why should we ignore
the complexity of things? Professor Tussey, in her engaging and thoughtprovoking new book, COMPLEX COPYRIGHT: MAPPING THE
INFORMATION ECOSYSTEM, effectively raises this question about
copyright. She argues that copyright policy makers should recognize how
copyright operates as a complex adaptive system. As a result, copyright
law will be more responsive to the needs of creative individuals and the
promotion of creativity.
She states her objectives clearly in her
introduction. “[A]n ideal copyright law would create a self-regulating,
homeostatic system in which market demand would create a feedback loop
driving the creation of culture” (p.11). With that goal in mind, Professor
Tussey weaves an argument that shows how copyright is akin to a prairie
ecosystem and how sometimes more flexible copyright law can lead to
more copyrighted works.
With all her references to systems, Professor Tussey may be labeled a
structuralist, someone who thinks that there are hidden structures that define
social relationships and our understanding of the world. But she makes
clear at the start of her argument that her concern is with behavior, not just
structures. What makes a system complex is different from what might
make it simply complicated, with lots of bells and whistles and moving
parts. A complicated system is at some level predictable, once the
connections among the parts are identified. A complex system, however,
has a degree of unpredictability as the remotest change might have
unforeseen consequences. To manage complex systems, one has to be
flexible and attuned to behavior. One has to take a bottom-up approach,
starting from experience and ending with rules and principles, which in turn
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shape experiences. Feedback and learning define complex adaptive
systems. They should also define copyright law and policy.
Professor Tussey makes her case for copyright as a complex adaptive
system carefully and meticulously. She starts from examining the
legislative institutions which give rise to copyright law. She accurately
portrays these institutions as a set of competing and deliberating economic
interests that guide the drafting of laws. As I read her description, such a
system is a closed one, seemingly impervious to outside influence,
particularly that of deeper or long term consequences beyond the narrow
interests of certain groups. How to break this closed system of law making?
Professor Tussey asks lawmakers, presumably with the aid of law
professors and other advocates, towards a more empirical understanding of
copyright law. Like the little boy who points out the emperor’s nakedness,
we need to confront the empirical reality that more copyright law does not
necessarily lead to more works or to innovation. Professor Tussey does a
nice job in collecting and summarizing the works of several scholars who
have taken on such an obvious, yet protean, task. In fact, Professor Tussey
argues that the scholarly literature supports the proposition that more
copyright might lead to fewer works. Empiricism breaks the closed loop of
copyright law making and adds a point of intervention. Copyright law must
be held to the standard of empirically verifiable consequences. Copyright
law must interact with the facts to reshape and reform in response to the
effects on creative output. This loop is one type of complex adaptive
system that Professor Tussey seeks to effectuate in her rendering of
complex copyright.
Another system is that of creativity itself, which needs to respond to the
changing environment of technology and social values. The Internet is the
most obvious and salient example of the changing environment. Changing
norms that push towards group creation or audience participation (and user
generated content more broadly) are other examples. Copyright law can be
a tool to prevent such shifts in creativity. For example, incumbent
copyright owners use copyright law to fight technological change, such as
the VCR, or file sharing, or Internet fora, like YouTube. These legal battles
are ones over conflicting business models or ones over how to acquire the
surplus created by new markets, media, and technologies. Nonetheless,
within complex adaptive systems, creative practices and copyright law need
to adapt to changes in the environment, instead of reacting to preserve
obsolete forms of creating and distributing information. A dynamic
copyright law that learns to adapt would be one that is, as she describes,
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self-regulating and homeostatic, one that evolves in a self-directed and
stable manner.
Professor Tussey does offer some specifics in designing and implementing
her ideal copyright system. Drawing on the work of Elinor Ostrom,
Professor Tussey asks how to more carefully consider the actual design of
institutions that demonstrate how people actually do manage resources. A
clear directive for her book is a more engaged empiricism. In addition, her
book asks us to think of the law in dynamic terms, as opposed to a set of
static rules and doctrines that are tailored to various facts. Law does not
simply act on facts, but is shaped by them. Professor Tussey is urging us to
move in that direction of thinking as well.
Professor Tussey gives us much to think about in understanding copyright
law and policy. My first thought was to her reference to a copyright
system. This reference is to the set of doctrines and policies that describe
the ecosystem of copyright law. I wonder if this is the right system with
which to begin the analysis of complex adaptive systems. More relevant in
my opinion is the ecosystem of authors, artists, publishers, distributors,
readers, consumers, and entrepreneurs that interact in the realm of creation,
production, and distribution. The question is how to design a copyright
regime to effectively and appropriately govern this complex ecosystem. In
other words, the law is the means, and not the ends. The complexity of the
copyright system is the tail that is wagged by the needs and wants of the
various constituencies and interests that constitute the creativity ecosystem.
The distinction I make is a relevant one. The complexity of copyright law
may reflect and suit the needs of these constituencies. But the relevant
landscape is not the legal one. While ultimately the copyright system is
what we must design, we need to understand the complex relationships and
behavior that copyright law has to serve.
In thinking of the creativity ecosystem, I was struck by Professor Tussey’s
reference to “market demand” which she describes as creating a feedback
loop driving the creation of culture. If market demand is the keystone for
copyright, there are two striking problems. First, why should consumer
needs be the ones that drive creativity, and not the needs and desires of
creative people? Steve Jobs famously stated that he viewed innovators as
leaders, not followers. Henry Ford said that if he asked consumers what
they wanted, they would have asked for a faster horse. Ford did something
better. Analogously, consumers of culture may simply want more action
movies, more explicit pornography, and more filling beer. De gustibus non
disputandum, but at the same time, creative artists more often than not fill a
need that many consumers never knew they had. It is not completely clear
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how non-consumer interests would figure into Professor Tussey’s identified
ecosystem.
Even more vexing is the emphasis on market demand. I assume by her
reference to a market, Professor Tussey means a price mediated institution
that allows consumers to express a willingness to pay which serves a signal
for how creative people should guide their creative energies. As a matter of
reality, perhaps market demand is the correct way to frame the problem.
But Professor Tussey should be more explicit in depicting this market. Is it
price-mediated? Is there a dimension of non-price or quality-based
competition? Is it a completely free market or does government regulation
figure in somehow? Is there a market for speech and ideas as well as one
for goods and services? If so, how are all of these to be recognized? These
questions are not meant to be pedantic ones. If the goal is to address the
ecosystem of creativity and if the market is to somehow figure into that
ecosystem, then we need some account of what this market looks like and
how it functions.
Professor Tussey’s reference to market demand is even more telling in light
of her appeal to complex adaptive systems. One example of a complex
adaptive system is the economic vision of markets. A general equilibrium
view of markets is a type of complex system, entailing the interaction of
many demanders and many suppliers coordinated through the working of
price mechanisms. There is no doubt that it is a complex system. It is also
one that adapts, and its adaptation can be simulated through changes in the
economic environment of technologies and preferences. But it is also a
description of a complex environment that elevates the values of wealth
maximization and efficiency over those of distribution and fairness.
My point is that referring to creativity and copyright as parts of a complex
adaptive system requires more detail in order to have traction for law and
policy. On this point, I think Professor Tussey offers a nice starting point,
but more work has to be done to flesh out the institutional details of the
complex system that she imagines. Despite her appeal to market demand, I
think she does mean something more than the economic general equilibrium
model of markets. New institutional theorists, following from Coase, and
economic and legal historians of widely diverging stripes (North, Hurst,
Grief) offer contrasting frameworks for addressing complex systems. Each
bases the representation of the complex system on different assumptions
and empirical understandings. In subsequent work, it would be interesting
to see how Professor Tussey fleshes out the complexity of creativity and
copyright based on her own understandings. The additional details will
make her arguments stronger and more convincing.
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I also wanted to see more discussion of the normative framework for
assessing copyright law and the complex ecosystems. Is the concern with
freedom to create? Or is there also a concern with the distributional
consequences of such freedom? The normative framework can make a
difference for assessing copyright policy as it shapes the ecosystem of
creativity. The normative framework would also affect how we understand
the big question raised by Professor Tussey’s book. Even if an ecosystem is
a complex one, does the law that governs a complex ecosystem also have to
be complex? The copyright system may rest on simple principles that can
effectively guide an adaptive creativity ecosystem. How about a rule like:
transformative authors always win? Such a rule would support the creator
of a movie against an unauthorized copier of a DVD. Such a rule would
support the unauthorized creator of a funny YouTube parody against the
author of the source work. I am not advocating such a rule, but I could see
how such a simple rule could have traction in organizing and governing the
complex ecosystem of creativity. I did not get a sense from Professor
Tussey’s book on how to choose among different institutional arrangements
for copyright. If the sole criterion is one of creativity and the generation of
more works, then simple rules like that one I propose would be quite
appropriate.
In conclusion, Professor Tussey has written a thought-provoking book and
is in good company with many recent books that address intellectual
property reform. I recommend reading and thinking about her arguments,
and I look forward to see how she builds on her important and provocative
ideas.
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IMITATION TO INNOVATION IN CHINA heralds a new generation of
English monographs that examines the Chinese intellectual property regime
for its own sake. Yahong Li delves into the challenges of innovation and
patent protection in China’s rapidly evolving biotechnology sector, and
those who join her foray are rewarded with a new appreciation of how the
patent system relates to its traditional promise of spurring innovation. Her
study of China’s patent system avoids the narratives of counterfeit and
piracy that came to dominate so much of the writing on Chinese IP
protection in the last decade.
This reorientation could not have come too soon. Even as of 2011, the
Chinese IP headlines that captured public attention worldwide were the case
of the fake Apple Store in the city of Kunming and the alleged
misappropriation of high speed rail technology by the Chinese government.
To the extent that China’s IP developments are recognized in the legal
literature, they are tempered with anxieties about “indigenous innovation”
and “junk patents”, both negatively connoted. The emphasis is distinctly
exogenous and mercantilist—China’s IP practices are only interesting, it
would seem, to the extent that they are shown to have effects on the West
and vice versa. Li’s study is refreshing because it examines patent law in
light of its original function of promoting domestic welfare.
It is precisely in her frank and relentless investigation of the link between
Chinese patent and pharmaceutical innovation that the book finds resonance
outside the immediate circle of Chinese IP scholarship. Stripped to its core,
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her subject is the relationship between patents and innovation—the
perennial debate at the center of the patent field. Those who have read
Christine MacLeod’s analysis of the English patent system during the
industrial revolution know that in order to understand the strengths and
weaknesses of ones’ own system, it is sometimes necessary to observe its
operation from the outside and subject it to conditions far from one’s own. 1
This time Li takes us to China, and with higher stakes: her subject is the
present, and her audience includes policymakers and entrepreneurs who are
in a position to influence economic development and medical welfare in the
most populous country in the world.
Chapter one situates the readers in the current split in the literature
regarding the role of patents vis-à-vis innovation in developing countries;
that is, do patents help or hurt development? (pp.14-16). Chapter two
surveys a dense array of statistics characterizing the growth of China’s
biotech and pharmaceutical sector, and chapter three enlists detailed case
studies showcasing the variation of R&D capacity, collaboration models,
and government support across technology subfields. Together, these two
descriptive chapters introduce the state of the Chinese biotech and
pharmaceutical sector at the start of the century: China is strong in
genomics, transgenic organisms, cloning, and biopharmaceuticals but
weaker in chemical drug discovery and stem cell research (pp.30-38); a
great majority of the support comes from the government, alongside foreign
investments and collaborators drawn by China’s market, low cost, talent
pool, and R&D infrastructure (pp.42-43).
Chapter four begins the theoretical inquiry with a study of China’s R&D
models, which Li divides into four categories from the least to the most
innovative: imitation, “me-too” innovation, “me-better” innovation and
“me-first” innovation (pp.52-59). For the first category, studies of
pervasive copying are duly cited: 97% of synthetic drugs are copies of
others products, 99% of all companies involved in anti-cancer drugs
produce imitation drugs, generics make up 90% of the biologics drug
market (pp.52-53). But on balance, pure copying is no longer a viable
business model due to low prices, fierce competition, infringement risk and
diminishing returns on further copying since “there are not many new drugs
left to be imitated” (p.53). Meanwhile, breakthrough innovations are
“practically impossible” for China’s current scientific and financial strength
(p.65). The only path left open, she reluctantly acknowledges, is that of
incremental innovation based on variations of the existing state of the art,
which in turn depends on “sophisticated legal and technical expertise to find
the patent loopholes of pioneer inventions ...” (p.65). Chapter five
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examines biotech and pharmaceutical patenting trends and further reveals
that the better IP assets and stronger patents are still in the hands of
multinational corporations, despite increasing patent filings from domestic
companies, which in turn leads to increasing patent litigation.
So how should China formulate its patent system to enable an incremental
innovation strategy when the sector is dominated by the IP of multinational
pharmaceutical corporations? To answer this question, Li examines
Chinese patent law as it applies to this sector. She addresses issues of
patentable subject matter (Chapter 6), conditions of patentability (Chapter 7)
and the treatment of patent rights (Chapter 8). The Chinese government
appears to have responded to foreign patents by trimming back protection in
the latest round of patent amendments in 2008 (p.169). Li instead
prescribes a stronger patent system and more patenting as the solution
(pp.157, 161). This central policy claim is based on the balance of the
patent’s dynamic incentives versus the static welfare loss particular to
China.
On the positive side, Li observes substantial prospect interest and signaling
effects at work:
…Patents do promote innovation in the biotechnology and
pharmaceutical industries to the extent that they boost
incentives for investment from domestic private sector and
foreign investors, foster an innovative spirit and culture
among research institutions, and help to identify national
strategic areas for S&T development (p.157).
On the issue of the welfare loss due to a possible patent thicket or limited
medical access, she finds the effect less serious than some have assumed.
To the former, she notes that “the obstacle for technology access was not
caused mainly by patents but rather by the MPC patent holders, who
account for about a third of total patent holders in China” (p.177). This
obstacle is surmountable because historically MPCs have not obtained
extensive patent coverage and now face successful patent challenges. For
example, out of eleven Chinese patent applications that were filed for the
transgenic “Golden Rice”, only two were granted, and even those two were
ultimately invalidated (p.170). Moreover, the industry has a successful
track record of licensing or inventing around patented technology and
Chinese companies can reverse their fortunes by patenting more innovations
of their own. On the balance, it is better to maintain strong incentives to
promote innovation and let time fix the uneven distribution of patents than
to reduce the desire for innovation overall. As for public medical welfare,
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she ascribes access problems to the profit motives of hospitals and generics
companies themselves rather than to patent exclusivity (p.171).
Scholars of Chinese IP law or technology development will benefit from
Li’s extensive collection of references and the synthesis of Chinese
language materials. These, especially the analysis of legal disputes and
government support programs, are rarely in one place and accessible to the
English-speaking community, although the majority of the data and cited
studies predate 2008 and reflect a historical snapshot from half a decade
prior. For example, the study reports that only 15.4 percent of domestic
patents were granted for inventions as opposed to utility models or
industrial designs in 2008 (p.70). The latest figure from SIPO for 2011
suggests the mix of invention patents has increased to 25.4% a mere three
years later, which appears to confirm Li’s endorsement of China’s technical
capacity. 2 To be sure, all studies have to cut off at some point, and these
historical figures represent a testament to the rapid changes going on in
China. They also provide a baseline matrix for future comparisons.
Those interested in broader IP and development issues will relate to “the
context of China’s transitional economy and its place as the world’s largest
developing country with a relatively high technological capacity” (p.157)
but “low capacity in commercialization” (p.161) and draw immediate
comparisons to the other BRIC countries facing a similar confluence of
foreign patent ownership and domestic needs. Li’s approval of a strong
patent regime seems to contradict the path taken by other developing
countries such as India, Brazil and Thailand, but China is simply at a
different point along the trajectory of economic transformation. Whether
one agrees with Li’s ultimate conclusion that China is ready for a strong
patent system, policymakers can look to the technological conditions
examined in this study to evaluate when and whether a national patent
system should switch from low protection to higher protection.
Developed countries boasting a higher level of innovative capacity may also
take heed, notwithstanding Li’s prescription targeting “incremental
innovation”. The division of innovative capacity into pure imitation, “metoo” imitation, “me-better” and pure imitation may be more suited to
catalogue inventiveness ex post rather than serving as ex ante policy
guideposts. It can provide a useful descriptive framework to consider the
effects of patent law on countries at varying stages of development. But
attention to detail is crucial to the categorization project: to illustrate the
concept of “me-too” innovation, for example, Li cited Cialis and Levitra as
analogues of Viagra, even though these chemical analogues are new
chemical entities with improved therapeutic profiles and developed by
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recognized innovators like Bayer (p.54). Li also includes in the example of
incremental innovation three Chinese-developed cancer treatment products,
Gendicine, Oncorine, and Endostar, which are no less than the first, second,
and third commercially available gene therapy products anywhere in the
world (pp.34, 55). If all that Chinese firms can manage are incremental
innovations of such caliber, they would have done very well in terms of
profitability, patient welfare, and contribution to the store of knowledge. It
is unclear that we would want to provide less of a reward to beneficial
improvements merely because they are incremental, nor should we presume
to know what policy choice promotes disruptive technology over
incremental improvements. Thus, Li’s advice for China is equally relevant
to countries that have embraced a notion of innovation broader than a “flash
of creative genius”. 3
IMITATION TO INNOVATION IN CHINA is an endorsement of the
patent system based on a look from the inside, making it far more credible
than a call for higher IP protection during bilateral trade talks. However,
the endorsement is clearly situational: the perceived benefits are reserved
for those countries having significant technical capacity but relatively fewer
blocking patent rights. The ironic lesson of the China case is that the
benefits of a stronger patent system may depend on a prior period of lesser
protection. Interestingly, this suggests that perhaps there is no optimal
national patent system but only an optimal cycle of patent systems that
waxes and wanes in counter step to the level of patenting.
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